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News--or foresight--about future economic fundamentals can create rational expectations equilibria
with non-fundamental representations that pose substantial challenges to econometric efforts to recover
the structural shocks to which economic agents react. Using tax policies as a leading example of foresight,
simple theory makes transparent the economic behavior and information structures that generate non-fundamental
equilibria. Econometric analyses that fail to model foresight will obtain biased estimates of output
multipliers for taxes; biases are quantitatively important when two canonical theoretical models are
taken as data generating processes. Both the nature of equilibria and the inferences about the effects
of anticipated tax changes hinge critically on hypothesized tax information flows. Differential U.S.
federal tax treatment of municipal and treasury bonds embeds news about future taxes in bond yield
spreads. Including that measure of tax news in identified VARs produces substantially different inferences
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1 Introduction
A venerable tradition, often traced to Pigou (1927), ascribes a signiﬁcant role in aggregate
ﬂuctuations to economic decision makers’ responses to expectations about not-yet-realized
economic fundamentals. That tradition ﬁnds voice in a recent surge of interest in the eco-
nomic consequences of news—or foresight. Recent work explores how news aﬀects the pre-
dictions of standard theories, seeks evidence of the impacts of news in time series data, and
estimates dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models to quantify the relative importance
of anticipated and unanticipated “shocks” to fundamentals.
Existing work typically posits a particular stochastic process for news, grounded in nei-
ther theory nor empirics. That process determines the economy’s information ﬂows and, in
a rational expectations equilibrium, agents’ expectations. Given the prominent role of ex-
pectations in the news literature, it is remarkable that existing work does not systematically
examine how the speciﬁcation of information ﬂows aﬀects the nature of equilibrium and the
connection of theory to data. This paper addresses that gap.
For several reasons we focus on how to identify and quantify the impacts of foreseen
“shocks” to taxes. First, few economic phenomena provide economic agents with such clear
signals about how important margins will change in the future: foresight is endemic to tax
policy. Second, an institutional structure governs information ﬂows about taxes: the process
of changing taxes entails two kinds of lags—the inside lag, between when new tax law is
initially proposed and when it is passed, and the outside lag, between when the legislation is
signed into law and when it is implemented. That institutional structure informs the nature
of tax information ﬂows. Third, diﬀerential U.S. tax treatment of municipal and treasury
bonds leads to a direct measure of tax news that oﬀers a potential solution to modeling tax
foresight. Such measures are scarce for news about nonpolicy fundamentals like total factor
productivity. Despite the paper’s focus on taxes, one of its key message—that hypothesized
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information ﬂows are critical to determining the impacts of news—extends immediately to
other contexts.1
Fiscal foresight poses a challenge to econometric analyses of ﬁscal policy because it gen-
erates an equilibrium with a non-fundamental moving average representation. Information
sets of economic agents and the econometrician tend to be misaligned, with agents basing
their choices on more information than the econometrician possesses. Structural shocks to
tax policy, then, cannot be recovered from current and past ﬁscal data, a central assumption
of conventional econometric methods. Instead, conventional methods can lead the econo-
metrician to label as “tax shocks” objects that are linear combinations of all the exogenous
disturbances at various leads and lags.2
This paper builds on and extends Hansen and Sargent’s (1991b) general characterization
of the implications of environments in which the history of innovations in a vector autore-
gression does not equal the history of information that agents observe. First, we go beyond
treating invertibility as a 0–1 proposition by assessing the quantitative importance of failing
to model foresight in two workhorse macroeconomic models. Second, we oﬀer a compelling
economic example—tax foresight—that makes clear that non-fundamentalness and its con-
sequences aﬀect answers to substantive macroeconomic questions. Most importantly, we
ground non-fundamentalness in economic theory, which points toward an empirical line of
attack that we pursue. Both Hansen and Sargent (1991b) and Fern´ andez-Villaverde, Rubio-
Ram´ ırez, Sargent, and Watson (2007) have been read primarily as cautionary notes, in large
part because they point to a serious problem but not to a way forward.
No consensus exists on how to handle tax foresight, a fact that is underscored by the
diverse empirical ﬁndings in the literature. Research concludes that an anticipated cut in
taxes may have little or no eﬀect [Poterba (1988), Blanchard and Perotti (2002), Romer and
Romer (2010)], may be mildly expansionary in the short run [Mountford and Uhlig (2009)],
or may be strongly contractionary in the short run [House and Shapiro (2006), Mertens and
Ravn (2011)]. By using diﬀerent measures of tax news, these studies implicitly posit diﬀerent
tax information ﬂows, which, as we show, can produce strikingly diﬀerent inferences about
the eﬀects of anticipated tax changes.
The paper has three major parts:
1. A simple analytical example makes precise how foresight and optimizing behavior cre-
ate equilibria with non-fundamental moving average representations. The example
makes the source of non-fundamentalness transparent: it arises as a natural by-product
of the fact that agents’ optimal intertemporal decisions discount future tax obligations.
1In addition to taxes, studies have examined news about a wide range of fundamentals, including total
factor and investment-speciﬁc productivity [Beaudry and Portier (2006), Christiano, Ilut, Motto, and Ros-
tagno (2008), Jaimovich and Rebelo (2009), Schmitt-Groh´ e and Uribe (2008), Fujiwara, Hirose, and Shintani
(2011)]; government military spending run ups [Fisher and Peters (2009), Ramey (2011)]; phased-in govern-
ment infrastructure spending [Leeper, Walker, and Yang (2010)]; announcements of interest-rate paths by
inﬂation-targeting central banks [Blattner, Catenaro, Ehrmann, Strauch, and Turunen (2008), Las´ een and
Svensson (2011)]. All of these applications lend themselves to the analysis that we conduct.
2Issues associated with non-fundamentalness were pointed out in the rational expectations econometrics
literature by Hansen and Sargent (1980, 1991b) and Lippi and Reichlin (1993, 1994) and recently emphasized
by Fern´ andez-Villaverde, Rubio-Ram´ ırez, Sargent, and Watson (2007). Leeper (1989) and Yang (2005)
examine the issues in the context of tax foresight.
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Although private agents discount tax rates in the usual way, they discount recent tax
news more heavily than past news because with foresight the recent news informs
about taxes in the more distant future. The econometrician, in contrast, discounts
in the usual way, down weighting older news relative to recent news. Agents and
the econometrician employ diﬀerent discounting patterns because the econometrician’s
information set lags the agents’.
2. Simple analytics reveal the source of non-fundamentalness, but do not shed light on
whether it matters in practice. Using two canonical dynamic stochastic general equi-
librium models—Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan’s (2008) real business cycle model and
Smets and Wouters’ (2003; 2007) new Keynesian model—as data generating processes,
we quantify the inference errors an econometrician might make by failing to model fore-
sight. We tie those errors to alternative, empirically motivated speciﬁcations of tax
news processes—information ﬂows that distinguish between the “inside” and “outside”
lags associated with tax policies. Estimates of tax multipliers can be oﬀ by hundreds
of percent and even be of the wrong sign. Biases can be positive or negative, but the
econometrician tends to underestimate the eﬀects of foresight over longer horizons.
3. We exploit a feature of the U.S. tax code that exempts municipal bonds from federal in-
come tax to extract news about future tax changes from the spread between municipal
and treasury bond yields. This is a ﬂexible method to distinguish between anticipated
and unanticipated shocks to taxes that does not require ap r i o r iassumptions about the
period of foresight or the nature of information ﬂows, assumptions that other empirical
approaches to foresight are forced to make. Statistically, spreads are Granger-causally
prior relative to the information sets in the ﬁscal VAR systems that Blanchard and
Perotti (2002) and Mountford and Uhlig (2009) estimate. Employing exactly the iden-
tiﬁcation schemes and data sets of Blanchard-Perotti and Mountford-Uhlig, we ask
how augmenting the econometrician’s information set with a direct measure of tax
news aﬀects inferences. For Blanchard-Perotti, results change dramatically: antic-
ipated tax increases raise output substantially for about three years before output
begins to decline. Diﬀerences also emerge for Mountford-Uhlig. Investment multipli-
ers, which Mountford-Uhlig estimated to be zero, become signiﬁcantly positive and
evidence emerges against the zero restrictions that Mountford-Uhlig impose to identify
tax foresight.
The body of the paper concentrates on empirical eﬀorts to estimate the eﬀects of foresight
in loosely identiﬁed econometric models. In the concluding remarks we discuss two alter-
native strategies. The ﬁrst estimates fully speciﬁed dynamic stochastic general equilibrium
(DSGE) models, as Schmitt-Groh´ e and Uribe (2008) and Fujiwara, Hirose, and Shintani
(2011) do, which is closely related to “root ﬂipping” to obtain the non-invertible representa-
tion that foresight creates, as in Mertens and Ravn (2010) and Kriwoluzky (2010). A second
strategy expands the econometrician’s information set in an eﬀort to ensure a fundamental
representation [Forni and Gambetti (2010a,b)].
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2 Analytical Example
This section introduces ﬁscal foresight into a simple economic environment where the econo-
metric issues can be exposited analytically. Results and conclusions reached in the simple
exposition extend to more general setups, as section 2.2 discusses.
Consider a standard growth model with a representative household that maximizes ex-
pected log utility, E0
 ∞
t=0 βt log(Ct), subject to Ct + Kt + Tt ≤ AtKα
t−1,w h e r eCt, Kt, Yt,
and Tt denote time-t consumption, capital, output, and lump-sum taxes, respectively, and
At is an exogenous technology shock. As usual, 0 <α<1a n d0<β<1. The government
sets the tax rate according to a time-invariant rule and adjusts lump-sum transfers to sat-
isfy the constraint, Tt = τtYt. Government spending is identically zero. Labor is supplied
inelastically which, as section 3.3 shows, understates the problems that foresight creates.












Ct + Kt = Yt = AtK
α
t−1. (2)
Let A and τ denote the steady state values of technology and the tax rate. The steady
state capital stock is K =[ αβ(1 − τ)A]1/(1−α). Let lower case letters denote percentage
deviations from steady state values, kt =l o g ( Kt) − log(K), at =l o g ( At) − log(A), and
ˆ τt =l o g ( τt)−log(τ). Log linearizing (1)–(2) yields an equilibrium that is characterized by a
second-order diﬀerence equation in capital
Etkt+1 − (θ
−1 + α)kt + αθ










where θ = αβ(1−τ) is a particularly important constant in the analysis. Assuming an i.i.d.
technology shock, the solution to (3)i s








Equilibrium investment depends negatively on the expected discounted present value of
future tax rates, a well-known result [Lucas (1976), Abel (1982), Judd (1985), Auerbach
(1989)]. Of course, more distant tax rates receive heavier discount than more recent rates.
To model foresight, we must specify how news about taxes signals future tax rates. For
many of the points we wish to make, it suﬃces to assume that tax information ﬂows take a
particularly simple form: agents at t receive a signal that tells them exactly what tax rate
they will face in period t+q. In later sections we will relax this assumption and posit more
sophisticated rules for tax rates. The tax rule is τt =¯ τeετ,t−q, or in log-linearized form
ˆ τt = ετ,t−q (5)
Assume the technology and tax shocks are i.i.d. and the representative agent’s information set
at date t consists of variables dated t and earlier, including the shocks, {εA,t,ε τ,t}. Given the
tax rule in (5), this implies that at t the agent has (perfect) knowledge of {ˆ τt+q, ˆ τt+q−1,...}.
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Using the information ﬂows in the tax rule to solve for expected tax rates in (4)f o r
various degrees of ﬁscal foresight yields the following equilibrium dynamics.
q = 0 implies:
kt = αkt−1 + εA,t (6)
q = 1 implies:
kt = αkt−1 + εA,t − κετ,t (7)
q = 2 implies:





q = 3 implies:
kt = αkt−1 + εA,t − κ
 




where κ =( 1− θ)(τ/(1 − τ)).
If there is no foresight, q =0 , we get the usual result that i.i.d. shocks to tax rates
have no eﬀect on capital accumulation. When there is some degree of tax foresight (q>0),
rational agents will adjust capital contemporaneously to yield the unusual result that even
serially uncorrelated tax hikes reduce capital accumulation. Fiscal foresight manifests in the
additional moving average terms present in the equilibrium representation. The number of
moving average terms increases with the foresight horizon.
A striking, though seemingly perverse, implication of (8)a n d( 9)i st h a tm o r erecent news
is discounted (by θ = αβ(1−τ) < 1) relative to older news. This is because with two-quarter
foresight, ετ,t−1 aﬀects ˆ τt+1, while ετ,t aﬀects ˆ τt+2, so the news that aﬀects tax rates farther
into the future receives the heaviest discount. While tax rates are discounted in the usual
way, tax news is discounted in reverse order. This diﬀerence in discounting between tax
rates and tax news stems from optimizing behavior and underlies the econometric problems
that foresight creates.
2.1 The Econometrics of Foresight The moving average terms that foresight pro-
duces pose challenges for conducting econometric inference. Conventional econometric anal-
yses, such as those using identiﬁed vector autoregressions (VARs), can draw erroneous con-
clusions. Errors arise because models with foresight may imply that the information set of
private agents is larger than the econometrician’s.
An econometrician who estimates an identiﬁed VAR aims to condition on the same
information set as the economic agents to recover the structural shocks {ετ,t−j}∞
j=0. Typically,
this is achieved by conditioning the VAR estimates on current and past observable variables.
Consider the univariate case of conditioning on current and past capital, {kt−j}∞
j=0,a n d
suppose that agents have two quarters of foresight. Using lag operators (i.e., Lsxt = xt−s),
(8) may be written as
(1 − αL)kt = −κ(L + θ)ετ,t. (10)
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Will the econometrician’s conditioning set, current and past capital, span the same
space as the agents’, current and past structural shocks?3 The answer depends on whether
{ετ,t−j}∞
j=0 is fundamental for {kt−j}∞
j=0, using the terminology of Rozanov (1967). Fun-







is a convergent sequence. If |θ| > 1 this condition holds and {kt−j}∞
j=0 spans the same space
as {ετ,t−j}∞
j=0. But a unique saddlepath solution requires |θ| < 1. Therefore, {ετ,t−j}∞
j=0 is
not fundamental for {kt−j}∞
j=0.
To determine the econometrician’s information set, we derive the Wold representation
for kt from the one-step-ahead forecast errors associated with predicting kt conditional only
on its past values. This representation emerges from ﬂipping the root of the moving average
representation from inside the unit circle to outside the unit circle using the Blaschke factor,
[(L+θ)/(1+θL)] [see Hansen and Sargent (1991b) or Lippi and Reichlin (1994)]. The Wold
representation for capital is











      












By observing current and past capital, the econometrician recovers current and past ε∗
τ,
rather than the news that private agents observe, current and past ετ. The econometrician’s
innovations are the statistical shocks associated with estimating the autoregressive repre-
sentation; those shocks turn out to represent information that is mostly “old news” to the













= θετ,t +( 1− θ
2)ετ,t−1 − θ(1 − θ
2)ετ,t−2 + θ
2(1 − θ
2)ετ,t−3 + ··· (12)
This mapping shows that what the econometrician recovers as the tax innovation at time
t, ε∗
τ,t, is actually a discounted sum of the tax news observed by the agents at date t and
earlier.
An econometrician who ignores foresight will discount the innovations incorrectly. In the
econometrician’s representation, yesterday’s innovation has less eﬀect than today’s innova-
tion, as the terms θε∗
τ,t−1 + ε∗
τ,t in (11) show. Agents with foresight, in contrast, discount
news according to ετ,t−1 + θετ,t,a si n( 8), because yesterday’s news has a larger eﬀect on
3More speciﬁcally, the information sets are equivalent if the the Hilbert space generated by {kt−j}∞
j=0 is
equivalent (in mean-square norm) to the Hilbert space generated by {ετ,t−j}∞
j=0.
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capital accumulation than today’s news. Diﬀerences in discounting patterns applied by the
econometrician and the agents lead to a variety of econometric problems.
By employing VAR analysis and not modeling foresight, the econometrician has con-
ditioned on a smaller information set. The extent to which private agents condition on
information that is not captured by current and past variables in the econometrician’s infor-
mation set determines the error associated with the VAR. This error can be mapped directly
into the θ parameter that governs the non-invertibility of the equilibrium moving-average

















where εt denotes current and past ε. For the econometrician’s information set, the variance






















The ratio of (13)t o( 14)i sθ2.A s θ2 approaches unity (zero), the diﬀerence between the
agent and econometrician’s information sets gets smaller (larger). If θ is greater than or
equal to 1, the representation for capital becomes fundamental with respect to ετ,t and the
variances of the forecast errors (13)a n d( 14)c o i n c i d e .
To examine the importance of the information discrepancies in this model, we plot
impulse response functions conditioning on the agents’ and econometrician’s information
sets. Impulse response functions are widely used to convey how agents respond to in-
novations, but response functions based on the econometrician’s information set will not
capture these responses. Consider the impulse response functions generated by (8)a n d
(11). Figure 1a plots the responses of capital assuming two quarters of foresight (with
α =0 .36,β =0 .99,τ =0 .25,σ2
τ = 1). With foresight, agents know exactly when the in-
novation in ﬁscal policy translates into changes in the tax rate. This creates the sharp
decline in capital one quarter after the news arrives and before the tax rate changes, as the
dotted-dashed line indicates. The econometrician’s VAR, though, discounts the innovations
incorrectly and reports that the biggest decline in capital occurs on impact, suggesting that
foresight does not exist (solid line). The diﬀerence between the response functions can be
quite dramatic, especially at short horizons.
Figure 1a shows that the econometrician will infer that the tax shock is unanticipated.
Of course, not all shocks that aﬀect ﬁscal policy are known several quarters in advance.
Consider a tax rate process, ˆ τt = eu
τ,t + ετ,t−q, that allows for both anticipated (ετ)a n d
unanticipated (eu
τ)s h o c k sa tt i m et. If these shocks are orthogonal at all leads and lags,
then the equilibrium dynamics of (3) will not change because i.i.d. tax shocks will not
alter the dynamics of capital. An econometrician who does not account for foresight will
attribute all of the dynamics associated with the anticipated component of the tax rate
to the unanticipated component. This suggests that researchers interested in the dynamic
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Figure 1a: Response of K with q =2















Figure 1b: Response of K for VAR (τt,k t)
Figure 1: Responses of Capital to Tax Increase with α =0 .36,β=0 .99,τ =0 .25. Figure 1a
plots the response of (13)a n d( 14). Figure 1b plots the response to the VAR (τt,k t) .B o t h
ﬁgures assume two quarters of foresight.
eﬀects of ﬁscal policy—whether the interest is in anticipated or unanticipated changes in
policy—must explicitly account for foresight to avoid spurious conclusions.
Conditioning on more variables will not always lead to better inference. In the case of
two-quarter foresight, suppose the econometrician estimates a VAR that includes the tax
















xt = H(L)t. (15)
A necessary condition for t to be a fundamental for xt is that the determinant of H(z)b e
analytic with no zeros inside the unit circle. Foresight creates a zero inside the unit circle
(at z = 0), implying that the information set generated by {xt,xt−1,xt−2,...} is smaller than
the information set generated by {t,t−1,t−2,...}.
The Wold representation for (15) is obtained by ﬁnding Blaschke matrices B(L)a n d
orthonormal matrices W, ˜ W that do not alter the covariance generating function of xt, but
“ﬂip” the zeros outside of the unit circle. To do this we search for a B(z)a n dW, ˜ W that
satisfy B(z)B(z−1)  = I and WW  = I, ˜ W ˜ W   = I, and produces innovations that span
the space generated by {xt,xt−1,xt−2,...}. Following appendix A of Townsend (1983), the
ﬁrst step in the algorithm is to evaluate H(z)a tz = 0, and postmultiply by W so as to
put the zeros in the ﬁrst column of the product matrix. The remaining columns of W can
be constructed using a Gram-Schmidt orthogonalization procedure. The orthonormal W
matrix ensures that the representation remains causal, preserving the assumption that the
econometrician does not observe future values of the variables. Postmultiplying by B(L)
ﬂips the zero outside of the unit circle. With two zeros inside the unit circle for (15), one
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must repeat this exercise (ﬁnd an orthonormal matrix ˜ W that aligns the zeros in the ﬁrst










































⎦, ˜ W =
 
Δ(1 + κ2θ2) −Δκ







and Δ = [(1 + κ2θ2)2 + κ2]−1/2.
Now the econometric problems are more severe. First, the econometrician who proceeds
with VAR analysis using (16) will likely obtain an impulse response function in which fore-
sight does not appear to exist in the data. Figure 1b depicts the response of capital to a tax
increase for the agent (dotted-dashed line) and econometrician as the variance of the tech-
nology shock decreases from 1 to 0.01. Conditioning on the econometrician’s information
set, the path of capital is ﬂat when σ2
a = σ2
τ = 1. In theory, unanticipated i.i.d. capital tax
shocks have no eﬀect on the economy, so based on the ﬂat response of capital, an econometri-
cian will infer that the eﬀects of ﬁscal policy are limited to unanticipated components only.
By not modeling foresight, this example achieves a “self-fulﬁlling prophesy” and wrongly
concludes that foresight is not an issue.4
Second, as the variance of the tax shock increases relative to the technology shock, the
errors associated with foresight become more pronounced. Figure 1b shows that the initial
response of capital to a one-standard-deviation increase in the tax shock increases from 0 to
0.12 as σ2
a decreases from 1 to 0.01, so that an anticipated tax increase could be estimated
to have no eﬀect or a positive eﬀect on capital and output.
Existing empirical work reports a diverse set of inferences about the eﬀects of an antic-
ipated tax increase on output. Figures 1aa n d1b demonstrate that even this simple model
can deliver diverse results that depend on the underlying information ﬂows.
Finally, all conditional statistics reported by the econometrician will be misspeciﬁed.















denote the j-step ahead prediction error variance associated with the econometrician’s in-
formation set, where Σ∗ is the variance-covariance matrix associated with (ε∗
τ,t,ε ∗
A,t) . Like
impulse response functions, variance decompositions are derived using conditional expecta-
tions, so the discrepancy in the information sets implies the coeﬃcients generated by H∗(L)
4With this simple form of foresight, an econometrician who estimates a VAR in (ˆ τt+q,k t) will recover
the true shocks. But more sophisticated information ﬂows, as in later sections, or empirically plausible tax
rules, as in Leeper, Plante, and Traum (2010), preclude that easy ﬁx.
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will misallocate the variance across the structural shocks.5 Figure 1b suggests that the
econometrician will treat the tax shock as nearly i.i.d. and infer that none of the varia-
tion in capital (and hence output) can be attributed to tax innovations; all of the variation
will be attributed to the technology shock. This inference holds even if, in fact, the tax
shock explained nearly all of the variation in capital (for example, when the variance of the
technology shock, σ2
A, is arbitrarily small).
We derive further implications of foresight in appendix A, where we show that Granger
causality tests and tests of economic theory, such as tests of present value restrictions, will
be misspeciﬁed in the presence of foresight. Errors associated with ignoring foresight can be
quite large.
2.2 Generalizations The previous example assumes an i.i.d. tax shock, but the dif-
ﬁculties associated with foresight extend to more general setups. Suppose the stationary
tax rate follows ˆ τt = C(L)Lqετ,t, where C(L) is a polynomial in the lag operator L and q
is the degree of foresight. The only restriction placed on C(L) is that the corresponding
coeﬃcients are square summable, which allows for any serial correlation pattern. Agents
guess that the law of motion for capital is given by a square summable linear combination of
tax and technology shocks, kt = F(L)ετ,t + G(L)εa,t, as Whiteman (1983) shows. Focusing
on tax shocks only and substituting this guess into the diﬀerence equation for capital in (3)
yields
θL








where the Weiner-Kolmogorov formula is used to take expectations (i.e., Etxt+1 = L−1[D(L)−
D0]εx,t), and θ = αβ(1 − τ). Uniqueness of the rational expectations equilibrium requires




(1 − αL)(L − θ)
 
ετ,t. (17)
This equation makes plain how foresight impinges on optimal capital accumulation for any
choice of C(L). Whenever q ≥ 2, the equilibrium contains moving average components even
when C(L) is purely autoregressive. This representation suggests that it is straightforward
to construct impulse response functions that take a wide range of shapes (including hump-
shaped), for which the dynamic equation for capital continues to be non-invertible in current
and past kt. For example, setting C(L)=( 1− ρ1L − ρ2L2)−1 and assuming two quarters of
foresight (q = 2) implies that the tax shocks ετt are non-fundamental for kt if θ<(1+ρ1)−1.
Because the condition for a non-fundamental moving average representation is independent
of ρ2, impulse response functions of non-fundamental moving average representations can
adopt many forms.
The logic that leads foresight to produce equilibria with non-fundamental moving-average
representations extends to a large class of models. Consider the generic multivariate rational
5This result holds even though the statistical shocks of the VAR remain uncorrelated. Orthogonality of
the Blaschke and W matrices (B(L)B(L−1)=I and WW  = ˜ W ˜ W  = I) implies that the unconditional
second moments of the VAR system remain the same, but the conditional moments will be diﬀerent.
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expectations model
Γ0yt =Γ 1yt−1 +Ψ zt +Π ηt, (18)
where yt is an n × 1 vector of endogenous variables, zt is an m × 1 vector of exogenous
random shocks, η is a k × 1 vector of expectation errors, which satisfy Etηt+1 =0f o ra l lt.
Γ0 and Γ1 are n×n coeﬃcient matrices, along with Ψ (n×m)a n dΠ( n×k). Klein (2000)
and Sims (2002) use a generalized Schur decomposition of Γ0 and Γ1 to show that there
exist matrices such that Q ΛZ  =Γ 0, Q ΩZ  =Γ 1, Q Q = Z Z = In×n, where Λ and Ω are
upper-triangular. The ratios of the diagonal elements of Ω and Λ, ωii/λii, are the generalized





















(Ψzt +Π ηt) (19)
The system is partitioned so that the generalized eigenvalues imply an explosive path for
w2,t.Ω
−1
22 Λ22 is the multivariate analog to θ in the simple analytical example. Analogous
to (4), w2,t must be solved forward to ensure stability of the system. Sims shows that the
forward solution of (18)i s








22 Λ22,Θ z =Ω
−1
22 Q2Ψ. If the structural shocks, zt,a r ei.i.d. and agents do not
have foresight, then the last term in (20) drops out of the solution and the equilibrium has
a VAR representation. By conditioning on the control and state variables, yt, an econome-
trician who estimates a VAR will be able to recover the structural shocks. But when agents
have foresight, the equilibrium representation becomes a VARMA with the MA coeﬃcients
determined by the unstable generalized eigenvalues. Suppose the structural shocks are given
by zt =  t−q, and agents have foresight—at date t they observe  ’s dated t and earlier. The
equilibrium is
yt =Θ 1yt−1 +Θ 0 t−q +Θ y[Θz t−q+1 +Θ fΘz t−q+2 + ···+Θ
q−1
f Θz t]. (21)
As in the univariate case, the contemporaneous shocks are discounted the heaviest, which is
precisely why models with foresight are more likely to deliver non-fundamental equilibrium
representations.
The extent to which foresight leads to econometric errors depends on the underlying
structure of the economy and the nature of information ﬂows. The next section examines
this issue in two canonical macro models.
3 Quantitative Importance of Foresight
The information ﬂows speciﬁcation in (5) was chosen for its analytical convenience, not for
its plausibility. To assess the quantitative importance of foresight, this section generalizes
those ﬂows to capture actual news processes and embeds the generalized speciﬁcation in two
empirically motivated DSGE models. We show how the nature of information ﬂows aﬀects
the inference errors an econometrician can make by not modeling foresight. Quantitative
importance is summarized by dynamic tax multipliers, comparing those estimated by an
econometrician who ﬁts an identiﬁed VAR to the true tax multipliers.
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3.1 Modeling Information Flows Rich information ﬂows characterize the arrival and
accumulation of news about tax changes, but generally fall into two periods: between initial
proposal and ﬁnal enactment—or rejection—of a new tax law (“inside lag”) and between
enactment and when the law takes eﬀect (“outside lag”).6 During the inside lag, information
and expectations are evolving about the likelihood and the precise form of proposed legis-
lation. Sources of information that mark the beginning of the inside lag can be formal—a
president’s State of the Union speech—or informal—a politician’s campaign pledges. And
this early information may be conﬁrmed or contravened by subsequent actions.7 Outside lags
arise whenever there is a delay between the legislation’s passage and its implementation, as
when tax changes are phased in. The two types of lags diﬀer in important ways. During
the inside lag, anticipated taxes are uncertain; news arrives regularly and induces agents to
update their expectations. During the outside lag, the tax law has been adopted, no more
news arrives, and agents have perfect foresight about future tax rates.
Examples clarify the nature of information ﬂows. The Economic Recovery Tax Act of
1981, enacted in August 1981, phased in tax reductions through the beginning of 1984 to
yield an outside lag of 10 quarters. In announcing his candidacy for president in November
1979, Ronald Reagan made clear that he intended to substantially lower taxes: “The key
to restoring the health of the economy lies in cutting taxes” [Reagan (1979)]. News about
future taxes, then, arrived throughout 1980, evolving with Reagan’s prospects of winning
oﬃce. An additional six months passed between President Reagan’s formal call for tax relief
in February 1981 and the legislation’s enactment. The inside lag associated with this tax
change is, arguably, ﬁve or more quarters, with the weights agents place on the bits of news
changing over time. Taken together, the two lags imply a foresight period of about four
years.
Adjustments to Social Security taxes can entail extraordinarily long lags. The National
Commission on Social Security Reform was established in December 1981 to recommend
solutions to the System’s short- and long-term solvency problems. Its recommendations, re-
ported in January 1983, formed the basis for the Social Security Amendments of 1983, which
were enacted in April 1983. The Amendments phased in payroll tax increases beginning in
1984 and extending to 1990. Although their inside lag may have been only a few quarters,
the Amendments’ outside lag is over six years. Other changes in Social Security taxes had
comparably long lags.
To model these intricacies, we generalize (5) with a speciﬁcation of information ﬂows
about tax rates that is ﬂexible enough to capture both inside and outside lags. For labor
taxes, we posit
ˆ τL

















t is the labor tax rate, ξ permits rates to be correlated, and the ε’s are serially uncor-
6These labels date back to Friedman (1948), where we combine the “recognition” and “decision” lags to
form inside lags and our outside lags refer to how long it takes legislation to change tax rates.
7Announcing their candidacies, both Ronald Reagan and George W. Bush made clear their intentions
to cut taxes, well over a year before they took oﬃce and formally proposed tax cuts. George H. W. Bush,
in contrast, pledged in his announcement speech, “I am not going to raise your taxes—period.” That was
two-and-a-half years before he called for a tax increase. See http://www.4president.org for these speeches.
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related. To interpret the moving-average coeﬃcients as weights, we impose that
 
j φj =1 .
Exogenous tax processes are the best-case scenario for econometricians because identiﬁcation
is straightforward in the absence of foresight. This ensures that all errors arise solely from
foresight.
Modeling information ﬂows as moving average processes captures the idea that from
quarter to quarter news about taxes evolves randomly. News might accumulate, with infor-
mation improving and concentrating agents’ probability distributions over future tax rates.
Or news might disappoint, with agents’ expectations frustrated by realizations of ε’s that
reverse earlier expectations. This randomness captures the vagaries of the political process
that determines ﬁscal choices.
Speciﬁcation (22) embeds many of the information ﬂows that appear in theoretical studies
of foresight, including Christiano, Ilut, Motto, and Rostagno (2008), Jaimovich and Rebelo
(2009), and Fujiwara, Hirose, and Shintani (2011) in the context of technology news; Ramey
(2007) for government spending news; Yang (2005) and Mertens and Ravn (2011) with regard
to tax news, and Schmitt-Groh´ e and Uribe (2008) for news about a variety of variables. These
studies set φj =0f o ra l lj except for φq =1 ,w h e r eq is the period of foresight.8 These
speciﬁcations imply that once the news arrives, agents have q periods of perfect foresight
about the object being modeled. This may be an adequate assumption about information
ﬂows that stem from outside lags, but they miss altogether the inside lags. Inside lags
are periods when agents are learning about how the future may play out. Tax policies
develop over time, from initial informal proposals to formal proposals, all the way through
the legislative process. The φj coeﬃcients in (22) reﬂect how agents update their views
about taxes during the inside lags. Values of the φj’s describe how information ﬂows diﬀer
from period to period.
Existing work on foresight does not systematically distinguish between the information
ﬂows associated with inside and outside lags. Romer and Romer (2007, 2010) base their
tax-shock series on narrative sources that report both enacted and proposed tax changes,
but Mertens and Ravn (2011) treat all of the Romers’ anticipated tax changes as stemming
from outside lags. The Romers also limit themselves to actions that actually change tax
liabilities, so their data series excludes proposals that do not reach fruition. Ramey’s (2009;
2011) narrative analysis identiﬁes a number of instances where the news about major military
build ups arrived well before any explicit legislative actions were taken, which are clear
examples of inside lags. But Ramey’s (2007) theoretical speciﬁcation posits the analog to
(22) for military spending as an autoregressive process with a news shock lagged two periods,
capturing only the outside lag.
3.2 Model Descriptions We study a real business cycle model—closely related to
Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2008)—and a new Keynesian model—similar to those in
Smets and Wouters (2003, 2007)—but add distorting tax rates on capital and labor income.
These models are workhorses in the macroeconomics literature so we provide only brief
descriptions here. Appendix B describes the models and our estimation strategies more
8Some studies allow the news shocks, εt−j, to be drawn from distinct distributions for each j,a n ds e t
φj = 1 for each relevant j [Schmitt-Groh´ e and Uribe (2008), Fujiwara, Hirose, and Shintani (2011), and
Mertens and Ravn (2011)]. The j = 0 shock is unanticipated, while the j>0 shocks are anticipated given
information at time t.
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thoroughly.
In the real business cycle (RBC) model, a representative agent maximizes time-separable
discounted utility over consumption and leisure. The agent supplies labor and capital to a
representative ﬁrm, which produces output according to a Cobb-Douglas technology. The
government chooses a set of ﬁscal variables to satisfy the ﬂow budget constraint, Gt + Zt =
τL
t wtlt + τK
t rK
t kt−1,w h e r eGt is government consumption, and Zt is transfers.
Tax legislation tends to adjust labor and capital taxes simultaneously, following (22), and
its analog for capital tax rates. Yang (2005) estimates the correlation between tax rates at
0.5, implying the value of ξ. A a “typical” tax change, analogous to those studied in VARs,
moves the tax rates together.
Log-linearized government consumption policy follows the process
ˆ Gt = ρG ˆ Gt−1 + σGε
G
t . (23)
Lump-sum transfers adjust to balance the government budget constraint each period.
The new Keynesian (NK) model extends the RBC model to incorporate real and nom-
inal rigidities that have been shown to help ﬁt macroeconomic data. It also models ﬁscal
ﬁnancing by allowing spending to adjust to stabilize government debt. The NK model adds
external habit formation, diﬀerentiated labor types, a monopolistically competitive inter-
mediate goods sector, variable capital utilization, wage and price rigidities, and a monetary
authority that follows a Taylor-type rule for setting nominal interest rates. Tax policies obey
(22) and government spending policies follow the process








Yt−1 is the debt-output ratio and γX < 0.
We estimate the NK model using Bayesian methods and U.S. quarterly data from 1984 to
2007. To conduct simulations, we ﬁx parameters at the mode of the posterior distributions
(see table 4 in appendix B). For the RBC model, the structural parameters are calibrated to
the values used in the literature and standard deviations of the shocks are set to the values
estimated in the NK model (see Appendix B).
3.3 Information Flows and Estimation Bias The Romers’ (2007; 2010) narrative
analysis and Yang’s (2009) timeline of outside lags associated with federal tax changes re-
veal two critical features of information ﬂows about taxes. First, the foresight horizon varies
considerably from one piece of tax legislation to the next. Second, most tax changes en-
tail substantial inside and outside lags. The generalized speciﬁcation (22) can model these
features of information ﬂows; simple speciﬁcations like (5) cannot.
We examine the implications of four alternative information ﬂows in the two DSGE
models. The alternatives reﬂect the diversity of information ﬂows that previous authors
have documented. With a maximum length of tax foresight of eight quarters, the four
information processes we employ appear in table 1.
Processes I and II model inside lags that diﬀer in the intensity of information ﬂows. In I,
the ﬂows are smooth, so news over the previous six quarters receives equal weight. Tax laws
that make steady progress through the legislature and get implemented with little delay
create ﬂows like I. Process II concentrates the news on lags four through six, with small
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Process Lags Description Coeﬃcients
II n s i d e 6 q t r s , s m o o t h n e w s φj = 1
6, j =1 ,2,...,6
φ0 = φ7 = φ8 =0
II Inside 6 qtrs, concentrated news φ1 = φ2 = φ3 =0 .05,φ 4 =0 .25
φ5 = φ6 =0 .3,φ 0 = φ7 = φ8 =0
III Outside 8-qtr phase-in φj =0j  =8
φ8 =1
IV Outside 2-qtr phase-in φj =0 ,j  =2
φ2 =1
Table 1: Information Flow Processes. Coeﬃcient settings in tax rule (22).
weight on recent news. Tax changes implemented with a lag of about one year, with only
slight changes in details in the periods immediately before implementation, generate ﬂows
like II.
The outside lags in processes III and IV closely resemble the information ﬂows that other
authors posit [for example, Mertens and Ravn (2011), and Forni, Gambetti, and Sala (2011)].
These processes imply that agents have eight-qu a r t e r( I I I )o rt w o - q u a r t e r( I V )p e r f e c tf o r e -
sight about tax changes. Perfect foresight precludes any further changes in legislation, so
these processes are exclusively about implementation delays or phased-in tax changes.9
Table 2 summarizes the actual and estimated output multipliers associated with a typical
tax change in the RBC and NK models. In this exercise, the agent knows the information
process and observes the actual εt’s. The econometrician, on the other hand, bases inference
on a set of observable variables. We construct the innovations representation based on the
econometrician’s conditioning set and use the Kalman ﬁlter to back out the econometrician’s
inferences about the responses of output and taxes to a shock to the tax rate. For the RBC
model, the econometrician conditions on the labor tax rate, income tax revenue, output, and
investment; the conditioning set for the NK model adds government consumption, private
consumption, labor, government debt, inﬂation, and the nominal interest rate. Thus, the
estimated VAR contains several “forward-looking” variables. As a robustness check, we
examined many combinations of alternative conditioning variables and found results that
are consistent with those in table 2. We report biases as estimated less actual multipliers
and biases as a percentage of the actual multipliers. In the absence of foresight, the bias is
always zero.
Several general ﬁndings emerge from the table. Biases can be very large—hundreds of
percent—and can change sign over time across both models. In both models, the biggest
errors arise from outside lags—information processes III and IV—which are the information
ﬂows most frequently posited in work on foresight. Inside lags with moving-average terms—
processes I and II—produce smaller, though still sizeable errors. Information process III,
in which agents have two years of perfect foresight about tax rates, generates the largest
inference errors in both models. It also confounds dynamics: the econometrician estimates
that the strongest eﬀect is contemporaneous, while the largest impact actually occurs two
9Ideally, information ﬂows would encompass both inside and outside lags, but such ﬂows would take us
outside of a linear structure. For example, one could posit the ﬂows for the inside lag and then, conditional on
legislation having been enacted, switch to the outside lag speciﬁcation, a process that is inherently nonlinear.
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or three years later, depending on the model.
In the RBC model, actual multipliers change sign—positive in the foresight period and
negative later—but estimated multipliers are uniformly negative. Frictions in the NK model
propagate errors, making short/long-run distinctions less pronounced.10 In the frictionless
RBC model, biases dissipate over time.
A consistent ﬁnding across the two models is that for horizons of eight quarters and
beyond, the econometrician underestimates the multiplier. The lone exception being the
new Keynesian model under information process I. The discounting of the tax innovations
that appears in (4)a n d( 20) explains this result. An agent with q quarters of foresight
discounts the innovations so that the ετ,t−q shock receives little discount relative to shocks
dated t through t − q − 1. As in the analytical model, this perverse discounting occurs
because ετ,t−q informs about the contemporaneous tax rate, τt, while shocks dated t through
t − q − 1 inform about future tax rates. An econometrician, who does not observe the true
innovations, applies the conventional discounting to the innovations in her information set,
as in (11). This makes the econometrician’s impulse response functions die out faster than
the true impulse response functions, yielding the underestimates.
These ﬁndings establish two key points. First, failure to model ﬁscal foresight can produce
quantitatively important errors of inference in the canonical models used for macroeconomic
policy analysis. Second, the precise nature of information ﬂows about news matters for
the pattern of inference errors. Getting the information ﬂows “right” poses a substantial
challenge to DSGE modelers. We turn now to an empirical approach to extract the tax news
from data that does not require specifying the nature of information ﬂows.
4 Attacking the Problem
Fiscal foresight can imply that private agents’ information sets include news about tax
changes that is diﬃcult to embed into a VAR. We exploit a feature of the U.S. tax code
that exempts interest earnings on municipal bonds from federal income taxation to extract
news about future tax changes from yield spreads between municipal and treasury bonds.
We augment two standard ﬁscal VARs with bond spreads to re-examine the macroeconomic
eﬀects of anticipated taxes. Before launching into the empirical work, we connect two kinds
of non-uniqueness of moving average representations to existing eﬀorts to identify VARs,
with and without foresight.
4.1 Two Kinds of Non-Uniqueness Moving average representations are not unique
for two distinct reasons that Hansen and Sargent (1991a) emphasize. Consider the Wold













j < ∞ and ∗
t is an n-dimensional white noise process deﬁned as the
innovation in predicting xt linearly from its semi-inﬁnite past (∗
t ≡ xt − P[xt|xt−1]).
10This echoes Leeper and Walker’s (2011) results for foresight about technology.
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Real Business Cycle Model
Info Process 0 qtr 4 qtrs 8 qtrs 12 qtrs 20 qtrs peak (qtr)
Ia c t u a l0 . 1 9 −1.14 −1.48 −1.11 −0.65 −1.71 (6)
estimated −0.31 −1.35 −1.27 −0.97 −0.59 −1.57 (5)
bias −0.50 −0.21 0.20 0.14 0.06
%b i a s −263% −19% 14% 12% 8%
II actual 0.15 −0.54 −1.40 −1.05 −0.61 −1.62 (6)
estimated −0.56 −1.46 −1.19 −0.91 −0.55 −1.48 (2)
bias −0.71 −0.92 0.21 0.14 0.06
%b i a s −473% −169% 15% 13% 9%
III actual 0.09 0.16 −1.51 −1.12 −0.64 −1.51 (8)
estimated −1.44 −1.09 −0.82 −0.64 −0.39 −1.44 (0)
bias −1.54 −1.24 0.69 0.49 0.25
%b i a s −1641% −784% 46% 43% 39%
IV actual 0.16 −1.34 −1.00 −0.76 −0.45 −1.56 (2)
estimated −1.41 −1.06 −0.81 −0.62 −0.38 −1.41 (0)
bias −1.57 0.28 0.20 0.14 0.07
%b i a s −962% 21% 20% 18% 16%
New Keynesian Model
Info Process 0 qrt 4 qtrs 8 qtrs 12 qtrs 20 qtrs peak (qtr)
Ia c t u a l −0.08 −0.36 −0.48 −0.43 −0.24 −0.48 (8)
estimated −0.07 −0.44 −0.57 −0.51 −0.28 −0.57 (8)
bias 0.01 −0.09 −0.09 −0.08 −0.04
% bias 11% −24% −20% −18% −18%
II actual −0.06 −0.27 −0.43 −0.40 −0.23 −0.43 (9)
estimated −0.09 −0.37 −0.42 −0.37 −0.19 −0.42 (7)
bias −0.03 −0.10 0.00 0.04 0.04
%b i a s −51% −37% 1% 9% 19%
III actual −0.03 −0.12 −0.32 −0.37 −0.26 −0.37 (12)
estimated −0.14 −0.10 −0.08 −0.06 −0.01 −0.14 (0)
bias −0.11 0.01 0.24 0.32 0.25
%b i a s −340% 13% 76% 85% 95%
IV actual −0.06 −0.30 −0.33 −0.28 −0.14 −0.33 (7)
estimated −0.15 −0.24 −0.26 −0.22 −0.11 −0.26 (7)
bias −0.08 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.04
%b i a s −128% 22% 22% 22% 25%
Table 2: Output Multipliers for a Labor Tax Change, Correlated with a Capital Tax Change.
Multipliers are output responses scaled by the peak response of revenues, converted to dollars,
as in Blanchard and Perotti (2002). Agent knows the information process and observes the
actual  t’s. Econometrician bases inference on a set of observable variables, as described in
text. Biases equal estimated less actual multipliers.
There are two transformations that are observationally equivalent to (25). The ﬁrst










where the innovation is now deﬁned as U∗
t and H∗
jU−1 represents the altered impulse re-
sponses. If U is nonsingular, then the new innovations process spans the same space as xt
and the information content of U∗
t is identical to that ∗
t. This is the type of non-uniqueness
that Sims (1980) describes. Researchers confront this non-uniqueness with diﬀerent orthog-
onalization schemes that rotate the covariance matrix through recursive orderings [Sims
(1980)], short-run restrictions [Bernanke (1986), Sims (1986)], long-run restrictions [Blan-
chard and Quah (1989)], a combination of short and long-run restrictions [Gali (1999)], or
sign restrictions [Faust (1998), Canova (2000), Uhlig (2005)].
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A second type of non-uniqueness that is observationally equivalent to (25) is generated






j=0 spans a larger space than {xt−j}∞














Under the typical assumption that agents observe the structural shocks t directly while
the econometrician observes only xt, models with suﬃcient foresight belong to this class
of non-fundamental representations. The covariance generating functions of H(L)t and
H∗(L)∗
t are identical, but only H∗(L) possesses an invertible representation in xt.L e t
A(L)=H∗(L)−1. The typical VAR methodology delivers
xt = A
−1





0 in the usual way recovers the shocks ∗
t, but not the structural shocks, t,
that agents see.
Hansen and Sargent’s non-uniqueness point sends a clear message: to identify structural
shocks in a vector autoregression, both types of non-uniqueness must be confronted. Con-
fronting the non-uniqueness in (26)d o e snot solve the non-uniqueness of representation (27),
and vice versa. Although a large literature focuses on the non-uniqueness associated with
(26), identifying (27) requires the econometrician to condition on the same information set
as the agents they are modeling.
Casting the problem as resolving the two distinct forms of non-uniqueness sheds light on
approaches that appear in the empirical macro literature. One line of attack estimates con-
ventional VARs, identiﬁed in a variety of creative ways to isolate anticipated eﬀects, and then
examines the impacts of foresight [Sims (1988), Blanchard and Perotti (2002), Yang (2007),
Mountford and Uhlig (2009), Beaudry and Portier (2006), Fisher and Peters (2009),Barsky
and Sims (2011)]. For example, Beaudry and Portier (2006) and Fisher and Peters (2009)
condition on stock prices to capture news about expected changes in technology and govern-
ment spending, respectively. Barsky and Sims (2011) identify news about productivity as
the shock that is orthogonal to current utilization-adjusted productivity that best explains
future variations in adjusted productivity. A second line of attack rejects VAR identiﬁcation
schemes, arguing that VARs cannot adequately measure the impacts of foreseen changes in
ﬁscal policy, and takes a narrative approach to bring fresh data to bear on the identiﬁcation
problem [Ramey and Shapiro (1998), Edelberg, Eichenbaum, and Fisher (1999), Burnside,
Eichenbaum, and Fisher (2004), Ramey (2007), Romer and Romer (2010)]. A third ap-
proach uses standard methods, such as An and Schorfheide (2007), to estimate a model with
foresight. To pursue this approach, Schmitt-Groh´ e and Uribe (2008) make very particular
assumptions about the information ﬂows that give rise to foresight about technology and
11Foresight is not the only way to generate this type of non-uniqueness. Any structural VAR in which the
econometrician conditions on less or more information is subject to this form of non-uniqueness.
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government spending. The tradeoﬀ is that the modeler must be explicit about the role of
information in the economy.
Each approach has its strengths and weaknesses.12 A unifying theme underlying each
approach, though, is the need to specify an information structure that is consistent with
agents that have foresight. Although most papers do not explicitly cast the problem as
resolving the non-uniqueness of (27) by specifying information ﬂows, this is precisely what
each paper aims to do in its own way. We have seen in table 2 that diﬀerent assumptions
about information ﬂows can dramatically alter the dynamics of the model and the associated
econometric inferences. Careful modeling of the information available to agents is of ﬁrst-
order importance.
4.2 Municipal Bonds and Fiscal Foresight We now oﬀer a new method to capture
the information ﬂows associated with news about future tax changes in an estimated VAR
that builds on Poterba (1989). Identiﬁcation takes two steps. First, we condition on the
spread between municipal and treasury bonds to solve the non-uniqueness associated with
(27). Then we apply two well-known identiﬁcation schemes to identify the moving-average
representation in (26).
In the United States, municipal bonds are exempt from federal taxes.13 If YM
T is the
yield on a municipal bond with maturity T and YT is the yield on a taxable bond with
the same maturity, then if the bonds have the same callability, market risk, credit risk,
and so forth, an implicit tax rate is given by τI
T =1−Y M
T /YT. This is the tax rate at
which the investor is indiﬀerent between the tax-exempt and taxable bond. If participants
in the municipal bond market are forward looking, the implicit tax rate should predict
subsequent movements in individual tax rates. This tactic follows the advice of Sims (1977),
who shows that durable goods prices that are determined in spot markets, and ﬁnancial
prices in particular, should be nearly Granger-causally prior to any time series that market
participants observe. This observation motivates and restricts the kinds of information that
might be useful for capturing foresight in VARs, and explains why merely augmenting VARs
with “forward-looking” variables, especially slow-moving ones, is unlikely to be helpful.
Several papers document that municipal bonds respond to changes in tax policy [Poterba
(1989), Fortune (1996), Park (1997), and Ang, Bhansali, and Xing (2010)]. Leeper, Richter,
and Walker (2010) update Poterba (1989) and ﬁnd that municipal bonds are reliable predic-
tors of future tax changes. Many of these papers conclude that the short end of the municipal
bond yield curve predicts pending ﬁscal policy changes much more accurately than the long
end of the yield curve—the municipal bond puzzle [Chalmers (1998)]. In light of this puzzle,
our analysis uses municipal and treasury bond data with maturity lengths of one and ﬁve
years only.
A newly issued tax-exempt bond with maturity T, a par value of $1, and per-period
12We discuss the strengths and weaknesses of several approaches in more detail in Leeper, Walker, and
Yang (2008) (an earlier working-paper version of the current paper) and in Leeper, Walker, and Yang (2011).
13Depending on the type of bond, municipal bonds can also be exempt from the Alternative Minimum
Tax, state, and local taxes.
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t is the after-tax nominal interest rate for payments made in period t. No-arbitrage
conditions imply that an identical taxable bond paying coupon C, and selling at par satisﬁes
1=
 T









t is the future tax rate expected to hold in period t.
Bonds that sell at par have a yield-to-maturity that equals the coupon payments, so the
implicit tax rate is τI









where ωt = δt/
 T
t=1 δt and δt =( 1+Rτ
t)−t. The current implicit tax rate is a weighted aver-
age of discounted expected future tax rates from t =1t oT and should respond immediately
to news about anticipated future tax changes.
Equation (31) makes plain the advantages of using municipal bond spreads to capture
information ﬂows about pending tax changes. First, there is no need to specify ap r i o r ithe
period of foresight. Assuming market eﬃciency, the implicit tax rate reveals the extent to
which agents do or do not have foresight. Second, there is no need to specify a functional
form for information ﬂows. In the previous section, we modeled information ﬂows as coming
from one of several possible information processes. We would have to conduct a similar
sensitivity analysis if we were estimating a DSGE model. Using the implicit tax rate avoids
taking an ap r i o r istand on the nature of information ﬂows. Finally, as we emphasize below,
conditioning on the implicit tax rate resolves the non-uniqueness associated with moving-
average representation (27), which allows us to examine identiﬁcation schemes designed to
handle the non-uniqueness of representation (26).
We turn to two prominent identiﬁcation strategies that have acknowledged foresight in
the ﬁscal VAR literature—Blanchard and Perotti (2002) (BP) and Mountford and Uhlig
(2009) (MU). We derive conditions under which these identiﬁcation schemes capture the
true information ﬂows. We then augment each identiﬁcation strategy by conditioning on
implicit tax rates and argue that this additional step alleviates the problems associated with
foresight.
4.2.1 Blanchard and Perotti (2002) BP estimate a quarterly VAR in output, y,g o v -
ernment revenues net of transfers (including interest payments), τ, and government spending
(government consumption plus government investment), g. The data are logarithms of real,
per capita variables. We allow for both a deterministic trend (quadratic in logs) and a
stochastic trend (unit root with drift), as BP do.
Tests overwhelmingly support the causal priority of the implicit tax rate series in BP’s
VAR system. A test of whether lags of other variables help to predict spreads, given past
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information on spreads, yields χ2 statistics with signiﬁcance levels of 0.23 (deterministic
detrending) and 0.34 (stochastic detrending).14





























If agents have suﬃcient foresight, as BP themselves note and section 3 above documents, the
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t denote the shocks associated with representation (28). We diﬀerentiate







Section VIII of BP derives a mapping from the e∗
t shocks to the shocks observed by the
agents, et, that follows from augmenting the VAR as
τt = a1yt + A11(L)τt−1 + A12(L)yt−1 + e
∗τ
t (33)
yt = c0Et(τt+1)+c1τt + A21(L)τt−1 + A22(L)yt−1 + e
∗y
t (34)
where now output at date t responds to expected taxes at t+1. When agents have foresight,
it is likely that output will depend not only on current and lagged taxes but also on expected
taxes. BP show how the innovation in (33) led one quarter, e∗τ
t+1, can be used to instrument
for the expectational eﬀects in (34). For this instrumental variables approach to be valid, two
stringent assumptions must hold. First, agents must have exactly one quarter of foresight—
no more, no less. Second, the innovation, e∗τ
t ,i n( 33) cannot be correlated with other shocks
in the VAR.
Neither assumption is likely to hold in practice. As the previous section argues, the
length of foresight is likely to be much longer than one quarter and it varies substantially
over time. The BP identiﬁcation scheme cannot handle more than one quarter of foresight
because that would require an implausible lag in the discretionary response of ﬁscal policy.
With one quarter of foresight, the BP identiﬁcation requires no discretionary response of
ﬁscal policy to output realizations both this quarter and last quarter. Amending (34) with
Etτt+2, which allows for two quarters of foresight, requires that there is no discretionary
response of ﬁscal policy to output for three quarters, and so on. If agents have more than
one quarter of foresight, it is also very likely that the innovation e∗τ
t in (33) will be correlated
14Forni and Gambetti (2010b) and its references contain detailed discussion of tests for “informational
suﬃciency” of a VAR. According to their criteria, our test satisﬁes a necessary but not suﬃcient condition
for fundamentalness. Suﬃciency requires testing the null of no Granger causality against the principal
components from a factor model that contains a large set of macroeconomic data. For reasons discussed in
the conclusion we avoid using a factor model framework.
15To confront the non-uniqueness associated with representation (26), BP identify the et shocks by arguing
that legislative lags ensure that there can be no within-quarter adjustment of ﬁscal policy to unexpected
changes in GDP, other than “automatic eﬀects of activity on taxes and spending under existing ﬁscal policy
rules.” Automatic eﬀects operate through parameters aτy and agy, which are elasticities of tax revenues and
government purchases with respect to output. BP then show that once aτy and agy are calibrated to 2.08







t can be used as instruments in estimating cyτ and cyg.T h e
ﬁnal two parameters are set to either bτg =0a n dbgτ  = 0 or vice versa to triangularize the ﬁscal sector.
21Leeper, Walker & Yang: Foresight and Information Flows
with other shocks in the VAR. This is shown explicitly in moving-average representation (16)
of section 2.1. The innovation from the VAR in that example is a convolution of the tax and
technology shocks. This suggests that the instrument used by BP to account for foresight
will be only weakly correlated with the explanatory variable.
Now augment BP’s VAR system with data on the spread, s, between municipal bonds












































By conditioning on the implicit tax rate, the econometrician no longer needs to use the
innovation e∗τ
t as an instrument for the expectation in (34). An eﬃcient municipal bond
market makes the implicit tax rate equivalent to the expectation in (34), as (31)m a k e s
clear. This relaxes the stringent assumptions that BP’s identiﬁcation of foresight requires;
conditioning on the municipal bond spread posits that the innovations in (35) are the true
structural shocks (i.e., that the observables augmented with the implicit tax rate spans the
space of the shocks observed by the agents), and all that is left to achieve identiﬁcation is a
rotation of the covariance matrix. We make the reasonable assumption that news contained
in interest-rate spreads has no direct impact on current output, tax revenues, and spending.
This assumption sets both aτs and ags to zero and implies that the relationship between the
reduced-form and structural innovations for the tax and spending shocks of (35) are identical
to those of (32). We can now apply BP’s identiﬁcation of these shocks. We also identify
the “news” shock, es
t, (again following the lead of BP) by using the reduced-form shocks
and parameters as instruments to estimate csτ,c sg, and csy.16 To facilitate comparison, we
use the same data and follow the same detrending procedures as BP. We refer the reader to
Section III of BP for a more detailed discussion of the data and empirical approach.
Figure 2 plots the estimated mean responses to an unanticipated tax revenue shock
(panels C and D) and to a shock to the implicit tax rate (panels A and B), with one-
standard deviation bands computed by Monte Carlo simulations based on 500 replications.
Solid lines represent the deterministic-trend model and dashed lines the stochastic-trend
VAR. Following BP, we transform the original impulse responses to report the dollar response
of each variable to a dollar shock in the ﬁscal variables. We use the tax revenue data to
transform the implicit tax rate so that the impulse response is interpreted as a dollar shock
to anticipated tax revenue. Panels B and D of the ﬁgure condition on a ﬁve-year implicit tax
rate, implying that agents have a maximum of ﬁve years of foresight, but results are robust
to implicit tax rates with maturity less than ﬁve years.
Panel C is identical to BP’s ﬁgure III and shows that the response of output to a surprise
tax increase is negative and signiﬁcant. The heavy solid line in panel C is BP’s instrumental-
variable estimate of the eﬀect of foresight (ﬁgure VI in BP). That solid line represents the













t are used as instruments for csτ,c sg
and csy, respectively.
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BP estimated effects of foresight
Panel C: Output to Tax Revenue Shock
BP Figure III and anticipated eﬀects
Panel D: Implicit Tax to Tax Revenue Shock
Panel A: Output to Implicit Tax Shock Panel B: Revenues to Implicit Tax Shock
Figure 2: Estimated mean responses for deterministic trend (solid lines) and stochastic trend
(dashed lines) to a positive tax revenue shock (panels C, D) and positive implicit tax rate
shock (panels A, B) with one-standard-deviation bands.
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identifying foresight using their approach generates a positive response on impact, in contrast
to the negative response from the VAR that ignores foresight altogether. Beyond the impact
period, BP’s methodology does not, however, deliver responses that are statistically diﬀerent
from the VAR that ignores foresight. This result leads BP to conclude, “there is not much
evidence of an eﬀect of anticipated tax changes on output [p. 1353].”
Panel A contrasts sharply with BP’s ﬁndings: output rises substantially and signiﬁcantly
after an increase in the implicit tax rate. The anticipatory eﬀects of ﬁscal foresight last
well beyond the initial quarter and, in the short run, anticipated increases in tax rates are
expansionary.
Our approach generates markedly diﬀerent results from BP primarily because the implicit
tax rate provides ﬂexible information about the degree of foresight. BP’s identiﬁcation
permits only one quarter of foresight, while ours allows a maximum of ﬁve years. This is
an example of the kind of ap r i o r irestriction on information ﬂows that can drive inferences
about foresight. Panels B and D of the ﬁgure corroborate the plausibility of our identiﬁcation
by showing that tax revenues respond positively and signiﬁcantly to a positive innovation in
the implicit tax rate, as theory suggests. Further corroboration of the identiﬁcation comes
from the fact that the implicit tax rate does not respond signiﬁcantly to innovations in taxes,
which theory also predicts (panel D).
0 qtr 4 qtrs 8 qtrs 12 qtrs 20 qtrs
Panel A: Blanchard-Perotti, Deterministic Trend
GDP (BP) −0.69∗ −0.74∗ −0.72∗ −0.42∗ −0.22
GDP (U) −0.84∗ −1.15∗ −0.95∗ −0.36 −0.06
GDP (A) 0.03 0.19∗ 0.13∗ −0.02 −0.10∗
Panel B: Blanchard-Perotti, Stochastic Trend
GDP (BP) −0.70∗ −1.07∗ −1.32∗ −1.30∗ −1.29∗
GDP (U) −0.71∗ −1.15∗ −1.39∗ −1.34∗ −1.33∗
GDP (A) 0.04 0.17∗ 0.18∗ 0.18∗ 0.17∗
Panel C: Mountford-Uhlig, Output Multipliers
GDP (MU) −0.29∗ −0.79∗ −1.23∗ −1.61∗ −0.60
GDP (U) −0.27 −1.04∗ −1.64∗ −1.81∗ −1.05
GDP (A) −0.10∗ 0.04∗ 0.09 0.02 0.03
Panel D: Mountford-Uhlig, Investment Multipliers
INV (MU) −0.19 −0.27∗ −0.38 −0.46 −0.14
INV (U) −0.23 −0.31∗ −0.50∗ −0.42 −0.27
INV (A) 0.03 0.12∗ 0.14∗ 0.10 0.09
Table 3: Output and Investment Multipliers for an Implicit Tax Shock (A) and Tax Revenue
Shock (U). An asterisk indicates zero is outside of the region between the two one-standard
deviation bands. BP denotes the numbers from the VAR without municipal bonds.
Panels A and B of table 3 report estimated output multipliers for the estimated VAR.
The table also records results from BP’s table III for comparison. The primary diﬀerence
between the BP multipliers and ours is that we allow for the anticipatory eﬀect that arises
from foresight—the inside and outside lags. The row labeled GDP (A) is the multiplier
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associated with an innovation in the implicit tax rate arising from an anticipated increase in
tax rates. The row labeled GDP (U) is the multiplier associated with an innovation in the
tax revenue shock, identiﬁed as the eﬀect of an unanticipated tax cut.
Several features stand out. First, for the majority of the horizon and both detrending
methods, the output multiplier for the implicit tax rate is positive, so higher anticipated taxes
raise output in the short run. With the lone exception of the 1- and 12-quarter multipliers,
all multipliers in the anticipatory horizon have one-standard deviation error bands that do
not cross zero. The peak positive responses are 0.19 at 4 quarters (deterministic trend model)
and 0.18 (stochastic trend model). Second, the multipliers associated with the implicit tax
rate are much smaller in absolute value than those from the tax revenue shock. This suggests
that agents probably do not have perfect foresight, on average. Perfect foresight would imply
movements in macro aggregates that are about the same magnitude as for unanticipated
shocks (assuming identical variances). The relatively muted response of output to a shock
in the implicit tax rate suggests that more intricate information ﬂows than perfect foresight
(e.g., moving-average processes for news) are probably at work. Implicit tax rates capture
this kind of subtlety. Finally, unanticipated tax hikes have substantially larger eﬀects in the
VAR that includes the implicit tax rate than in the BP speciﬁcation, particularly for the
deterministic trend. For example, the one-standard deviation error bands on the 4-quarter
multiplier are −1.64 and −0.65, which nearly exclude the BP estimate of −0.74. This is
consistent with the numerical evidence presented in section 3.3, where the econometrician
consistently underestimates the multiplier.
Our ﬁnding that news of higher taxes increases economic activity over much of the an-
ticipation period, as ﬁgure 2 depicts, echoes results from two very diﬀerent methodologies.
In a case study, House and Shapiro (2006) argue that the phased-in tax reductions enacted
by the 2001 Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act played a signiﬁcant role
in creating the unusually slow recovery from the 2001 recession. By feeding the legislated
paths of marginal tax rates on labor and capital into an RBC model, the authors generate
a path of equilibrium GDP that shares qualitative features with panel A of ﬁgure 2.
Mertens and Ravn (2011) augment a VAR with Romer and Romer’s (2010) anticipated
tax liabilities series, which they treat as strictly exogenous in the VAR. Mertens and Ravn
append to each equation of the VAR a distributed lag of q periods in future tax liabilities.
They estimate that an anticipated tax increase induces a boom in output whose amplitude
and duration increase with the period of foresight q. In contrast to our approach with
muni-treasury spreads, Mertens and Ravn must specify ap r i o r ithe period of foresight
and maintain that anticipated taxes are exogenous—assumptions that are critical to the
quantitative eﬀects they obtain. Nonetheless, the qualitative eﬀects closely resemble those
in panel A of our ﬁgure.
Despite their diﬀerent methodologies, House-Shapiro and Mertens-Ravn share a common
economic explanation for their ﬁndings, which also applies to the RBC model in section 3.3.
Anticipated tax changes generate wealth eﬀects that kick in immediately—upon arrival of
the news—but the substitution eﬀects, which operate on critical economic margins, do not
aﬀect behavior until the tax rates have changed. In a conventional model, expected tax
increases reduce wealth, which induces agents to work harder, increasing employment and
output immediately.
Anticipated tax changes have sharply diﬀerent macroeconomic impacts in our model,
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which includes a direct measure of tax news and a ﬂexible speciﬁcation of foresight, than in
the instrumental variables, tightly circumscribed approach that BP take. These diﬀerences
underscore the importance of modeling information ﬂows.
4.2.2 Mountford and Uhlig (2009) Mountford and Uhlig (2009) impose restrictions
directly on the shape of the impulse responses of the VAR to identify economic shocks,
following the work of Faust (1998), Canova and Pina (2000), Uhlig (2005), and Canova and
Pappa (2007). Like BP, MU identify two ﬁscal policy shocks—a government spending shock
and a government revenue shock. They deﬁne a ﬁscal shock as a positive reaction of the
respective ﬁscal variable for four consecutive periods, including the impact response. This is
to ensure that only substantial movements in ﬁscal variables are counted as “shocks.” Fiscal
shocks are required to be orthogonal to business cycle shocks and monetary policy shocks.
Business cycle shocks are deﬁned as a shock which jointly moves output, consumption,
nonresidential investment and government revenue in the same direction for four quarters
following the shock.17 A monetary policy shock is deﬁned as a shock that moves interest
rates up and reserves and prices down for four quarters after the shock.
Like with most identiﬁcation schemes, this one intends to identify rotations of the covari-
ance matrix associated with representation (26). Caldara and Kamps (2010) and Caldara
(2010) show that the sign restriction approach of MU can be reinterpreted as pinning down
the elasticities associated with the BP system (32). And like BP, MU acknowledge the im-
portance of foresight and impose additional restrictions to account for it. These restrictions
are meant to solve the non-uniqueness associated with (27). MU argue that anticipated
ﬁscal policy changes can be identiﬁed by imposing zero restrictions on the responses of ﬁscal
variables over the period of ﬁscal foresight, reﬂecting the idea that the isolated policy shock
is news about a change in future, but not current, policy variables.
Under what conditions will the MU identiﬁcation scheme deliver correct inference? As the
analytical section shows, ﬁscal foresight does not imply a zero response of all ﬁscal variables
over the foresight period. The various ﬁscal rules considered in the previous section suggest
that this is an exceptional situation. In the special case where the tax rate is exogenous and
follows the simple rule
ˆ τt = e
u
τ,t + ετ,t−q (36)
when news arrives in period t, the tax rate does not change until period t + q. MU’s zero
restriction, if it were applied to the tax rate, would work in this case. But MU impose
the zero restriction on tax revenues. They ﬁnd that higher anticipated revenues reduce
output—and, therefore, the tax base—over the period of foresight. Lower output, coupled
with the restriction that revenues are ﬁxed, delivers the eccentric implication that a particular
sequence of unanticipated tax-rate increases, {eu
τ,t}, is imposed to identify an anticipated tax
hike. Considering that in most countries automatic stabilizers in the tax code would lower
rates when output falls, MU’s identiﬁcation scheme may have diﬃculty isolating the eﬀects
of ﬁscal foresight.
17To select among the many rotations consistent with this deﬁnition of the business cycle shock, MU
impose the criterion that substantial movements in output, consumption, nonresidential investment and
government revenue must be attributed to business cycle shocks.
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Panel C: Non-residential Investment Panel D: Tax Revenues
Figure 3: Estimated median responses with 16th and 84th percentile bands for MU VAR
speciﬁcation to a positive tax revenue shock (dashed lines) and MU VAR with muni spread
to a positive implicit tax rate shock (solid lines).
We revisit the MU estimation but, instead of zero restrictions on ﬁscal variables, we
condition on the municipal bond spread to account for ﬁscal foresight. To facilitate direct
comparisons, we use the same data and estimation procedure as MU. We estimate a VAR
in GDP, private consumption, total government expenditure, total government revenue, real
wages, private non-residential investment, interest rate, adjusted reserves, the producer price
index for crude materials, and the GDP deﬂator. Fiscal variables are deﬁned as in MU, who
follow BP; the remaining variables are quarterly observations from 1955 to 2000, and are
logarithms except the interest rate, which is in levels. The VAR has six lags and no deter-
ministic terms. Detailed descriptions of the data and estimation can be found in Appendixes
A and B of Mountford and Uhlig (2009). To the MU variables we add the municipal bond
spread (implicit tax rate). We identify a shock to the implicit tax rate as a positive response
to the municipal bond spread for four quarters, and impose that it is orthogonal to the other
shocks in the system.18
Figure 3 plots the median impulse response functions along with the 16th and 84th
percentile bands for the MU zero restriction approach to foresight and the VAR speciﬁcation
18MU’s model expands BP’s system of variables, but the test for Granger-causal priority of spreads still
yields a χ2 statistic with signiﬁcance level of 0.74.
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conditioning on the implicit tax rate. The solid lines show the responses to a positive
innovation in the implicit tax rate. The dashed lines show the response to a tax revenue shock
imposing zero restrictions on the ﬁrst four quarters (shaded area of panel D). Conditioning
on the municipal bond spread suggests that tax revenues are not zero over the foresight
horizon, contradicting the restriction imposed by MU. In response to a shock in the implicit
tax rate, tax revenues are negative on impact and then follow a hump-shaped pattern similar
to panel B of ﬁgure 2. We interpret the short-run response of tax revenues to an innovation
in the implicit tax rate as evidence that automatic stabilizers lower rates as output falls.
This, again, demonstrates the ﬂexibility of the muni spread in capturing information ﬂows.
In lieu of imposing a rigid four-quarter foresight assumption, the shock to the implicit tax
rate reports how agents respond to news about future tax changes.
Responses of many aggregate variables to a shock in the implicit tax rate are not very
diﬀerent from the responses when imposing MU’s zero restrictions. The consumption path
is nearly identical, with zero within the error bands for both identiﬁcation approaches. This
suggests that consumption does not respond signiﬁcantly to anticipated changes in future
tax rates, which is consistent with the evidence in the public ﬁnance literature [Poterba
(1988), Parker (1999), Souleles (1999, 2002)]. However, unlike the conclusions reached in
those papers, we do not take this as evidence of the lack of foresight. Many of the aggregate
variables respond in signiﬁcant ways to the news in implicit tax rates. For example, the path
of non-residential ﬁxed investment mimics the hump-shaped response of tax revenues. An
anticipated increase in tax rates produces a positive and signiﬁcant response of investment
for several quarters, which contrasts to the negative or zero response generated by imposing
MU’s zero restrictions.
Eﬀects of anticipated taxes in ﬁgure 3 are consistent with economic theory. Mertens and
Ravn (2011) emphasize the distinction between consumption of durables and nondurables
in understanding the impacts of anticipated tax changes. In their empirical and theoretical
analyses, Mertens and Ravn ﬁnd that, while foresight can have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on durable
consumption, nondurables are less likely to move in response to anticipated changes in tax
rates.19 Auerbach (1989) emphasizes the role of investment adjustment costs when examining
the dynamic eﬀects of anticipated taxes on investment. That investment responds positively
and signiﬁcantly over many quarters suggests that investment adjustment costs may be low:
if adjustment costs were high, ﬁrms would begin to decrease investment immediately in
response to an anticipated tax increase. Finally, counter to the results found in the BP
speciﬁcation, panel A shows that output responds negatively to an anticipated tax increase
in both identiﬁcation schemes. One explanation for the diﬀerences across BP and MU can be
attributed to the particular rotation of the covariance matrix implemented by MU. Caldara
and Kamps (2008) map the elasticities estimated by BP in (32) into the implied elasticities
from imposing the MU sign restrictions. They ﬁnd that MU impose a much higher within-
quarter elasticity of net taxes with respect to output. The higher elasticity will drive down
the response of output to an implicit tax rate shock.
Panels C and D of table 3 report estimates of the output and investment impact multi-
pliers to an innovation in the tax revenue shock (U), the implicit tax rate (A) and the tax
19They reconcile this empirical ﬁnding with theory by assuming habit formation in consumption and
complementarity in consumption goods, which smooth out the wealth eﬀects during the period of foresight.
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revenue shock in the original MU speciﬁcation. As was the case with the BP identiﬁcation,
the estimated eﬀects of an anticipated tax decline are smaller than the eﬀects of unantici-
pated shocks. Also similar, the MU identiﬁcation underestimates the size of the multipliers.
For example, at the eight-quarter horizon, the MU estimate of the median output multiplier
falls around the 20th percentile of the posterior for the tax revenue shock estimated from
the expanded VAR. Table 3 makes clear that accounting for foresight changes the estimated
output and investment multipliers associated with tax shocks.
5 Concluding Remarks
We have shown how foresight introduces econometric diﬃculties that complicate the in-
terpretation of conventional econometric analyses. Foresight, of any type, can introduce
non-fundamental moving average terms into the linear equilibrium process, changing the
mapping between the true news that agents observe and the “shocks” that the econometri-
cian identiﬁes. Many of the econometric techniques in macroeconomists’ toolboxes can be
distorted by empirical methods that do not adequately estimate the non-invertible moving
average components of equilibrium time series. Section 3 demonstrates that failing to model
foresight can produce quantitatively important inference errors in data generated by models
now in wide use for macro policy analysis. Section 4 employs municipal bond spreads to
capture information ﬂows about anticipated changes in tax rates. Incorporating this spread
into VARs and imposing well-known identiﬁcation schemes can drastically alter conclusions
about the dynamic eﬀects of anticipated tax changes.
Estimating the impacts of foresight requires either modeling the information ﬂows about
future economic fundamentals or ﬁnding direct and interpretable measures of news. In the
former camp are eﬀorts to estimate DSGE models with news and the closely related approach
that “ﬂips” the roots of the invertible process to obtain the non-invertible representation that
foresight creates. These eﬀorts resolve the econometric problems that foresight presents by
making strong assumptions about information ﬂows. Of course, the solutions are conditional
on the speciﬁed information ﬂows, aspects of the economic structure about which economists
rarely have well developed prior beliefs or direct empirical evidence.20
Some authors, rather than seeking direct measures of news, rely on adding variables to
try to align the econometrician’s and the agents’ information sets. Forni and Gambetti
(2010b) estimate large empirical models that boil all relevant information down to a few
critical factors and test whether a model’s information content is “suﬃcient” to ensure
fundamentalness. Their suﬃcient condition, however, will never be satisﬁed by the small-
to-medium-sized VARs that have been heavily used to extract economically interpretable
shocks. Because the estimated factors do not have clear economic interpretations, it is
impossible to discern precisely what information is being tested for.21 In contrast, our
approach to tax foresight or Ramey’s (2011) method for measuring news about government
defense spending focus narrowly on a particular, economically unambiguous, type of news.
20That the assumptions about information ﬂows matter to inferences from estimated DSGE models is
shown in two versions of the same paper that diﬀer in information ﬂow speciﬁcations and yield very diﬀerent
inferences [Schmitt-Groh´ e and Uribe (2008) and Schmitt-Groh´ e and Uribe (2010)].
21Tests for invertibility harken back to the 0−1 treatment of invertibility from which this paper advocates
moving beyond.
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Foresight poses a challenging mix of structural and measurement problems. Hypothe-
sized information ﬂows that are uninformed by observations and information sets that are
unrestricted by theory are unlikely to resolve the foresight problem. Answers lie in blending
theory with measurement.
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A Testing Economic Theory
A.1 Testing Present-Value Constraints An extension of the econometric impli-
cations is that tests of economic theory will also be misspeciﬁed. One important example
pertaining to ﬁscal policy is the testing of the government’s present-value constraint, which
links the value of government debt to the expected discounted value of future primary sur-
pluses. A widely-used approach to test present-value restrictions estimates a VAR with debt
and surpluses and then tests for the cross-equation restrictions that the present-value condi-
tion imposes on the model [Campbell and Shiller (1987)]. As we have shown, ﬁscal foresight
implies the VAR obtained by the econometrician will not yield the true dynamics and hence
will not impose the correct cross-equation restrictions in testing the present value condition.
To see how foresight will lead to type I error in present-value tests, consider an endowment
economy with lump sum taxes, a constant equilibrium real interest rate, and one-quarter
foresight with respect to innovations in surpluses (receipts less expenditures net of interest
payments on the government’s debt). Taking expectations conditional on information at
time t − 1 of the government’s ﬂow budget constraint yields
E(bt|Ωt−1)=β
−1bt−1 − E(st|Ωt−1), (A.1)
where st is the primary surplus, bt is one-period debt outstanding, and β−1 =( 1+r)i st h e
constant gross rate of return between time t and t + 1. Fiscal sustainability is ensured by
a policy rule that makes future surpluses rise with debt. Two exogenous disturbances—for
revenues and spending—drive surpluses and agents have one period of foresight over both
components of the surpluses. The policy rule is







where γ is set to ensure that the agent’s transversality condition for debt is satisﬁed and
0 <ρ 1,ρ 2 < 1 determine the serial correlation properties of the driving processes. The
expectations are taken with respect to the agents’ information set, which is assumed to
be, Ωt−1 = {ε1,t−j,ε 2,t−j}∞
j=1. If this process holds for t =0 ,1,...T, then imposing the











jE(st+j|Ωt−1)( A . 3 )
Following Hansen, Roberds, and Sargent (1991) and Roberds (1991), the cross-equation
















yt = P(L)vt (A.4)





(1−ρ2L)(1−γL). Two observations spring from (A.4).
First, foresight implies that (A.4) is not an invertible representation (due to the zero at L =
0). Second, the cross-equation restrictions imposed on the moving-average representation
are nonlinear.
In light of the second observation, Campbell and Shiller (1987) derive the present-value
restrictions on the VAR representation instead of the moving-average representation. This
simpliﬁcation makes the present-value constraint easy to test, as it amounts to restrictions
on the coeﬃcients of the VAR. Denote the invertible representation of (A.4)b yP∗(L)a n d





































∗yt−1 + wt (A.5)
Note that A∗(L)=P(L)∗−1, implying that the coeﬃcients of the VAR will not yield the
correct cross-equation restrictions implied by (A.4) when there is foresight. Campbell and
Shiller (1987) show that the restrictions on the VAR coeﬃcients implied by the present-value
constraint are given by
a11 + a21 =0 ,a 22 + a12 = β
−1 (A.6)
With foresight, however, the restrictions given by (A.6) will not hold even though the present-
value constraint is satisﬁed. The VAR estimates give
a11 + a21 =
ηρ1ρ2βA(β)C(β)
ρ2C(β) − ρ1A(β)
,a 22 + a12 =
A(β)ηρ2ρ1(C(β) − A(β))
β(ρ2C(β) − ρ1A(β))
where η =( 1+[ A(β)C(β)]2)−1/2. Therefore, the econometrician will incorrectly reject the
null hypothesis that the present-value constraint holds.
A.2 Tests of Granger Causality Sargent (1981) calls for Granger (1969)-Sims
(1972) causality tests to play a key role in helping the econometrician determine which
variables properly belong in agents’ information sets. For example, causality tests are com-
monly used to justify treating variables as exogenous for purposes of inference. Causality
tests, however, are misspeciﬁed if agents have ﬁscal foresight.23 To see this more clearly,
return to the analytical model of section 2 with one quarter of foresight and an i.i.d. tax
rule. The (true) moving-average representation, on the left, and the (econometrician’s) fun-





























22Given the structure of the non-invertibility, the invertible representation is obtained as in (16).
23Leeper (1990) shows that ﬁscal foresight can imply that money growth Granger-causes deﬁcits in an
equilibrium in which deﬁcits are systematically monetized.
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where δ =( 1+κ2)−1/2. Note that the zero appearing in the true MA will appear in the
opposite oﬀ-diagonal in the econometrician’s representation. By theorem 1 of Sims (1972),
the econometrician’s representation implies that ˆ τ fails to Granger-cause k;i nf a c t ,ˆ τ lies in
a proper subspace of k, and hence k fails to Granger-cause ˆ τ. By not modeling foresight,
the econometrician eﬀectively reverses the Granger-causal ordering of the true dynamics.
B Simulations Details
B.1 Specifications of Models For the quantitative results reported in section 3.3,w e
augment a prototype RBC model (similar to the one in Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2008))
and a standard New Keynesian model (similar to those in Smets and Wouters (2003, 2007))
with distorting taxes levied on capital and labor income. Agents in the models have foresight
over tax policy changes. This appendix describes the models and the calibration/estimation
strategy. Except for the parameters that characterize the information ﬂow processes in the
tax rules, the parameters in the RBC model are calibrated to the values commonly used in
the literature, and the NK model is calibrated to the posterior mode of an estimated New
Keynesian model, ﬁt to U.S. quarterly data from 1984 to 2007.





t [logct + φlog(1 − lt)]
over consumption ct and labor lt,w h e r eβ is the discount factor and φ is the preference










t kt−1 + zt,w h e r ekt is capital, wt is the wage rate, rK
t is the real rate of return
on capital, zt is government transfers, and δ is the capital depreciation rate.




t ,w h e r eyt
is output and ua





t ∼ N(0,1). The ﬁrm chooses capital and labor to maximize proﬁt:
yt − rK
t kt−1 − wtlt.
Let capital letters denote aggregate quantities. Each period the government chooses a
set of ﬁscal variables to satisfy its budget constraint, Gt + Zt = τL
t wtLt + τK
t rK
t Kt−1,w h e r e
Gt is government consumption. The goods market clearing condition is Yt = Ct + It + Gt,
where It = Kt − (1 − δ)Kt−1 is investment.
Capital and labor tax rates follow the policy rules described by (22) and its capital tax
analog. Government consumption policy follows (23), and lump-sum transfers adjust to
balance the budget each period.
B.1.2 New Keynesian Model The NK model expands the RBC model to incorpo-
rate a variety of real and nominal frictions. The economy is populated by a continuum of
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where ub




We assume external habits that depend on aggregate consumption last period, Ct−1.A si n
Erceg, Henderson, and Levin (2000), each household supplies unique labor inputs. A state-
contingent claim xt sold at a price of qt exists to eliminate the income diﬀerentials due to
















+zt +dt = ct +it+bt +qtxt+Ψ(vt)kt−1
where Wt is the nominal wage rate, Pt is the general price level, and πt ≡ Pt
Pt−1 is the
inﬂation rate. The model has variable capital utilization with the utilization rate vt;i nt h e
steady state, v = 1. Varying the utilization rate involves a cost Ψ(vt)kt−1,w h e r eΨi sa n





Ψ (1) . The nominal rental rate for eﬀective capital, vtkt−1,i sRK
t . it is investment








×it,w h e r e
s(·) is the adjustment cost function for investment; in the steady state, s(1) = s  (1) = 0,





t. Finally, each household owns an equal share of all
intermediate goods producing ﬁrms and receives dividends, dt.
Wages are rigid. A perfectly competitive labor packer purchases the diﬀerentiated labor
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t . The aggregate wage is Wt =








household j receives a signal to reset its nominal wage with a probability 1 − ωw.T h o s e




Prices are rigid. A perfectly competitive ﬁnal goods producer uses a continuum of



















t. Intermediate goods producers are monopolistic competi-
tors in the product market. Firm i produces with the technology yt = ua
t(vtkt−1)α(lt)1−α,
where ua




Analogous to households’ wage decisions, a monopolistically competitive intermediate ﬁrm
faces a probability 1 − ωp that is will be able to reset its optimal price. Firms that cannot
reoptimize index their prices to past inﬂation according to pt(i)=pt−1(i)π
χp
t−1. The goods
market clearing condition is Yt = Ct + It + Gt +Ψ( vt)Kt−1.
The monetary authority obeys a rule that sets the nominal interest rate
ˆ Rt = ρr ˆ Rt−1 +( 1− ρr)
 










Fiscal policy evolves according to the rules in (22)a n d( 24). The ﬂow budget constraint









πt + Gt + Zt.
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B.2 Calibration and Estimation The RBC model is calibrated to values in the lit-
erature (largely following those in Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2008)): β =0 .99, φ =1 .6
implying a steady-state labor share of 0.32, α =0 .36, G
Y =0 .2, and δ =0 .025. The steady-
state capital and labor tax rates are set at their sample means in the U.S. data from 1984 to
2007. The standard deviations of the technology, transfer, and capital and labor tax shocks
are calibrated to the estimated posterior modes for the same shocks in the NK model to be
described next (see table 4).
We estimate most of the parameters in the NK model using Bayesian methods, assuming
agents have no foresight over taxes. In the exercises, the model parameters are ﬁxed at the
posterior modes that table 4 reports.
The NK model is log-linearized and solved by Sims’s (2002) method. Models have no
growth; data are detrended with a linear trend, as in Smets and Wouters (2003). The sample
period, 1984-2007, is selected because monetary policy is widely believed to follow a Taylor
rule [Taylor (1993)]. The estimation uses ten observables: real consumption, investment,
labor, wage rate, the nominal interest rate, inﬂation, capital tax revenues, labor tax rev-
enues, the sum of real government consumption and investment, and government transfers.
Government data include all federal, state, and local levels. Section B.3 below describes the
data.
Several parameters, which are known to be diﬃcult to estimate from the data, are cal-
ibrated. The discount factor β is set to 0.99, implying an annual steady-state real interest
rate of 4 percent. The capital income share in output is α =0 .36. The quarterly depreciation





ηw ) are assumed to be 8, which implies the steady-state markups in the product
and labor markets are approximately 14 percent, consistent with evidence that the average
price markup of U.S. ﬁrms is between 5-15 percent [Basu and Fernald (1995)]. Steady state
(gross) inﬂation is assumed to be 1. Other calibrated parameters are steady-state ﬁscal vari-
ables, which are set to their sample means. Steady-state ratios of government spending and
debt to output come from their sample means: G
Y =0 .17 and sb =1 .58 (debt to quarterly
output), where output is the sum of consumption, investment, and government spending.
The steady-state capital and labor income tax rates are computed based on Jones’s (2002)
deﬁnition: τK =0 .36 and τL =0 .24. When estimating the model, the correlation parameter
of capital and labor tax shocks ξ is assumed to be zero. The simulation results in table
2 assumes ξ =0 .26, implying a correlation of 0.5 between capital and labor tax shocks as
estimated by Yang (2005).
We assume that parameters are drawn independently and restrict the parameter space to
deliver a unique rational expectations equilibrium. Our priors follow closely the priors used
in Smets and Wouters (2007) for most of the shared parameters (see table 4). Priors for
the debt ﬁnancing parameters (γg and γz) are guided by their implied dynamics. When γg
and γz are too high, macro variables oscillate because the government overreacts to stabilize
debt. On the other hand, when the parameters are too small, a solution does not exist
when monetary policy is active (in the sense of Leeper (1991)). Priors for γg and γz have
independent normal distributions with means of 0.15 and standard deviations of 0.05.
To search for the posterior mode, the log-posterior function is minimized by Christopher
Sims’s minimization routine, csminwel. We initiate the mode search from diﬀerent points,
and multiple modes do not appear to be a concern. Table 4 summarizes our estimation
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results and compares them with the estimates by Smets and Wouters (2007) over a similar
sample period. For structural and monetary policy parameters, most of our estimates are
comparable to theirs.
B.3 Data Description This section describes the data for estimating the NK model
and the municipal and treasury bonds data used in section 4.
B.3.1 Data for Estimating the New Keynesian Model Unless otherwise noted,
data are from the National Income and Product Accounts Tables released by the Bureau
of Economic Analysis.24 All data in levels are nominal values. To convert nominal values
to real per capita values, we deﬂate by the deﬂator for personal consumption expenditures
(Table 1.1.9, line 2) and a population index (described below).
Consumption. Consumption, C, is deﬁned as total personal consumption expenditures
(Table 1.1.5, line 2).
Investment. Investment, I, is deﬁned as gross private domestic investment (Table 1.1.5,
line 7).
Capital and Labor Tax Revenues. Following Jones (2002), the average personal





where IT is personal current tax revenues (Table 3.1, line 3),W is wage and salary accruals
(Table 1.12 line 3), PRI is proprietors’ income (Table 1.12, line 9), and CI is capital income.
Capital income is deﬁned as rental income (Table 1.12, line 12), corporate proﬁts (Table
1.12, line 13), interest income (Table 1.12 line 18), and PRI/2.
Labor income tax revenue, T l,i s
τ
p(W + PRI/2) + CSI
where CSI is contributions for government social insurance (Table 3.1, line 7). Capital
income tax revenue, T k is
τ
pCI + CT
where CT is taxes on corporate income (Table 3.1, line 5) and PT is property taxes (Table
3.3, line 8).
Government Consumption and Investment. Government consumption is deﬁned
as government consumption expenditure (Table 3.1, line 16), government investment for
defense (Table 3.9.5, line 13), and government net purchases of non-produced assets (Table
3.1, line 37), minus government consumption of ﬁxed capital (Table 3.1, line 38). Government
investment is deﬁned as government investment for non-defense (Table 3.9.5, line 18).
Transfers. Transfers, Z, are deﬁned as net current transfers, net capital transfers, and
subsidies (Table 3.1, line 25), minus the tax residual. Net current transfers are deﬁned as
current transfer payments (Table 3.1, line 17) minus current transfer receipts (Table 3.1,
line 11). Net capital transfers are deﬁned as capital transfer payments (Table 3.1, line 36)
minus capital transfer receipts (Table 3.1, line 32). The tax residual is deﬁned as current
24Further information on data construction appears in Traum and Yang (2010).
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Parameters Prior Posterior mode
func. mean std. our estimation S&W (2007)
Structural
γ, risk aversion G 1.75 0.51 .54 1.47
θ, inverse Frisch labor elasticity G 20 .52 .19 2.30
h, habit formation B 0.50 .15 0.31 0.68
ψ, capital utilization B 0.50 .15 0.45 0.69
s, investment adjustment cost N 41 .54 .61 6.23
ωw, wage stickiness B 0.50 .10 .69 0.74
ωp, price stickiness B 0.50 .10 .79 0.73
χw, wage indexation B 0.50 .15 0.45 0.46
χp, price indexation B 0.50 .15 0.23 0.21
Monetary and ﬁscal policy
φπ, interest rate response to inﬂation N 1.50 .25 2.22 1.73
φy, interest rate response to output N 0.12 0.05 0.04 0.08
φyd, interest rate response to output N 0.12 0.05 0.17 0.16
γg, government spending response to debt N 0.15 0.05 0.20 N.A.
γz, transfers response to debt N 0.15 0.05 0.13 N.A.
AR(1) coeﬃcients
ρa, technology B 0.50 .20 .93 0.94
ρb, preference B 0.50 .20 .89 N.A.
ρi, investment B 0.50 .20 .56 0.64
ρw, wage markup B 0.50 .20 .31 0.82
ρp, price markup B 0.50 .20 .49 0.74
ρr, interest rate B 0.50 .20 .86 0.29
ρg, government spending B 0.50 .20 .94 0.96
ρτ,k, capital tax B 0.50 .20 .92 N.A.
ρτ,l, labor tax B 0.50 .20 .88 N.A.
ρz, transfers B 0.50 .20 .86 N.A.
Std. of shocks
σa, technology IG 0.12 0 .55 0.35
σb, preference IG 0.12 1 .29 N.A.
σi, investment IG 0.12 2 .06 0.39
σw, wage markup IG 0.12 0 .27 0.21
σp, price markup IG 0.12 0 .16 0.11
σr, interest rate IG 0.12 0 .15 0.12
σg, government spending IG 0.12 1 .04 0.41
στ,k, capital tax IG 0.12 2 .65 N.A.
στ,l, labor tax IG 0.12 2 .46 N.A.
σz, transfers IG 0.12 3 .66 N.A.
Table 4: Prior and posterior distributions of the estimated parameters for the New Key-
nesian model. Functions G, B, N, IG denote Gamma, Beta, normal and inverse Gamma
distributions.
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tax receipts (Table 3.1, line 2), contributions for government social insurance (Table 3.1,
line 7), income receipts on assets (Table 3.1, line 8), and the current surplus of government
enterprises (Table 3.1, line 14), minus total tax revenues (the sum of labor, capital, and
consumption tax revenues, where consumption tax revenues are taxes on production and
imports (Table 3.1, line 4) less property taxes (Table 3.3, line 8).
Hours Worked. Hours worked are constructed from the following variables:
H the index for nonfarm business, all persons, average weekly hours duration, 1992 = 100,
seasonally adjusted (from the Department of Labor).
Emp civilian employment for sixteen years and over, measured in thousands, seasonally
adjusted (from the Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, CE16OV). The
series is transformed into an index where 1992Q3 = 100.




Wage Rate. The wage rate is deﬁned as the index for hourly compensation for nonfarm
business, all persons, 1992 = 100, seasonally adjusted (from the U.S. Department of Labor).
Inﬂation. The gross inﬂation rate is deﬁned using the GDP deﬂator for personal con-
sumption expenditures (Table 1.1.4, line 2).
Interest Rate. The nominal interest rate is deﬁned as the average of daily ﬁgures of
the Federal Funds Rate (from the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System).
Definitions of Observable Variables The observable per capita variable X is deﬁned








Popindex index of Pop, constructed such that 1992Q3 = 1;
Pop Civilian noninstitutional population in thousands, ages 16 years and over, seasonally
adjusted (from the Bureau of Labor Statistics).
x = consumption, investment, hours worked, the sum of government consumption and in-
vestment, capital tax revenues, labor tax revenues, and transfers. The real wage rate is
deﬁned in the same way, except that it is not divided by the total population.
B.3.2 Municipal and Treasury Bonds Data. Yields to maturity from 1954M1 to
1994M12 on tax-exempt prime-grade general obligation municipal bonds come from Salomon
Brothers, Analytical Record of Yields and Yield Spreads. Salomon Brothers’ municipal data
are collected on bonds of various maturity lengths on the ﬁrst of each month and based
on estimates of the yields of new issues sold at face value. Yields on similarly rated (AAA)
municipal bonds from 1994-2006 are obtained from Bloomberg’s Municipal Fair Market Bond
Index. Market yields on constant-maturity-adjusted, non-inﬂation-indexed U.S. Treasury
securities from 1955-2006 come from the Federal Reserve’s Statistical Release on Selected
Interest Rates. These yields reﬂect the average of the weekly values within each month,
which are interpolated from the daily yield curve.
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